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Abstract  
Conditionals can implicitly convey a range of speech acts including promises, tips, 
threats and warnings. These are traditionally divided into the broader categories of advice 
(tips and warnings) and inducements (promises and threats). One consequence of this 
distinction is that speech acts from within the same category should be harder to 
differentiate than those from different categories. We examined this in two self-paced 
reading experiments. Experiment 1 revealed a rapid processing penalty when 
inducements (promises) and advice (tips) were anaphorically referenced using a 
mismatching speech act. In Experiment 2 a delayed penalty was observed when a speech 
act (promise or threat) was referenced by a mismatching speech act from the same 
category of inducements. This suggests that speech acts from the same category are 
harder to discriminate than those from different categories. Our findings support a 
semantic distinction between speech act categories, but also reveal pragmatic differences 
within categories.  
Keywords: Conditionals, Comprehension, Promise, Tip, Threat  
PsychINFO classification code: 2340 
 
 3 
1.1 Introduction 
 
In everyday life, much information is communicated using the conditional form if p then 
q. For example, you might read “if you want to lose weight, you need to exercise more”, 
or you might tell your child “if you wash the car, I’ll pay you five pounds”. Alternatively, 
you may be advised “if you travel to Thailand, beware of pickpockets” or overhear an 
employee being told “if you’re late again, I’ll fire you”. Although these statements each 
follow the general conditional form, they implicitly convey different speech acts. The 
first communicates a tip, the second a promise, the third a warning and the fourth a threat. 
The purpose of the experiments reported below is to examine whether readers are 
sensitive during comprehension to the differing pragmatic functions associated with 
conditional statements that implicitly communicate different kinds of speech act.  
 The vast majority of psychological research on conditionals to date has been from 
a reasoning and decision making perspective (e.g., Evans & Over, 2004; Johnson-Laird & 
Byrne, 2002). A traditional view from this standpoint is that conditionals simply assert a 
logical proposition. However, conditional statements in everyday discourse are often used 
pragmatically to perform speech acts (Searle, 1969). These speech acts can be 
communicated explicitly (e.g., if you wash the car, I promise to pay you five pounds) or 
implicitly by omitting the performative verb (e.g., if you wash the car, I’ll pay you five 
pounds). In the latter case, the listener must infer the speaker’s intent.  
 Failure to make this inference and accurately discriminate between speech acts 
can have serious consequences. For example, a patient reading the conditional advice “If 
you choose treatment X, then your quality of life will improve” could misinterpret this 
statement (a tip) as a promise. This seemingly trivial error is potentially dangerous as 
promises presuppose a stronger causal relationship between antecedent and consequent 
than a tip, and are therefore likely to induce the stated action to a greater degree than the 
author might intend (Ohm & Thompson, 2004). For this reason it is important to 
understand exactly how everyday conditional speech acts are represented during 
comprehension.  
Within the domain of experimental psychology, a pragmatics-focused view on 
conditionals has recently been adopted (e.g., Bonnefon, 2009; Evans, Neilens, Handley, 
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& Over, 2008; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002). One fundamental line of research has 
sought to determine how people classify and discriminate between the pragmatic 
functions of conditional statements. In an initial attempt to model how people classify 
conditionals López-Rousseau and Ketelaar (2004) presented a simple two-stage 
pragmatic cues algorithm that successfully categorised over 85% of conditional speech 
acts as a function of speaker’s control of the consequent and utility for the listener. A 
revision of this algorithm (López-Rousseau & Ketelaar, 2006) which included the 
superordinate categories of advice and inducement (following a traditional distinction in 
research on pragmatic conditionals) successfully categorised 92% of conditional 
promises, threats, tips and warnings (see Fig. 1). 
 
 
****FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE**** 
 
 
In an effort to formalise the unique properties of all pragmatic conditionals Bonnefon 
(2009) developed a utility grid system that represents the utility of the antecedent and 
consequent events for both the speaker and listener. Following the algorithm developed 
by López-Rousseau and Ketelaar (2006), the utility grids for promises and tips specify a 
possible action (q) that has positive utility for the listener. Crucially, if q is a potential 
action of the speaker, then it is a promise; but if q is not a potential action of the speaker, 
then it is a tip. Likewise, threats and warnings describe a possible action (q) that has 
negative utility for the listener. In this case, if q is a potential action of the speaker, it is 
threat; but if q is not a potential action of the speaker, then it is a warning. 
These utility grids suggest that successful comprehension requires sensitivity to a 
range of pragmatic factors. However, it is not clear how people mentally represent these 
pragmatic relationships as they process conditionals in real time. Indeed, the vast 
majority of research into conditionals is based on analysis of the final, fully-formed, 
interpretation of a statement, rather than the incremental real-time processes that lead to 
this conclusion (see Stewart, Haigh & Kidd, 2009 for an exception). A key aim of the 
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experiments presented below is to determine how conditional speech acts form part of a 
reader’s semantic representation of the utterance during comprehension.  
While there is evidence that readers routinely represent a number of common 
speech acts online (e.g., request, remind, apology etc.; Holtgraves, 2008), studies 
focusing on conditional speech acts have been restricted to offline rating and deduction 
tasks (e.g., Evans et al., 2008; Newstead, Ellis, Evans, & Dennis, 1997). These studies, in 
combination with recent theoretical perspectives (e.g., Bonnefon, 2009; Evans, 2005; 
López-Rousseau & Ketelaar, 2006) suggest that conditional promises, tips, threats and 
warnings can be categorised and represented in one of two ways. Firstly, they can be 
represented at the semantically coarse grained level of the speech act category (i.e., 
inducement or advice). This is equivalent to stopping at Stage 1 in the pragmatic cues 
algorithm. Alternatively, they can be represented at the semantically finer grained level of 
the specific speech act itself, which is equivalent to completing both stages of the 
algorithm.  
One consequence of this distinction relevant to online processing is that it might 
be more cognitively efficient to represent a conditional in terms of its broad speech act 
category (as this only requires the operation one step in the algorithm) than to represent 
the specific speech act itself (which requires both steps). This would be consistent with 
the recent view that many aspects of comprehension involve cognitively efficient 
processing that often results in an underspecified semantic representation (e.g., Sanford & 
Graesser, 2006). A second consequence is that speech acts from different categories 
should be easier to differentiate than those from the same category. In other words, it 
should be more difficult to discriminate between a promise and a threat (both 
inducements) than to discriminate between a promise and a tip (which come from 
different categories).  
Determining the level of representation that readers engage in during 
comprehension is crucial, as a coarse-grained representation could lead to speech acts 
being misinterpreted and influencing behaviour in unintended ways. At present nothing is 
known about the degree of pragmatic information that is accessed during the online 
processing of conditional information. The experiments below examine how and when 
readers discriminate between speech acts during online comprehension. Firstly, 
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Experiment 1 looks at readers’ sensitivity to the broad distinction between the speech act 
categories of inducement and advice.  
 
2.1 Experiment 1 
In the word-by-word self paced reading experiment below we presented participants with 
a number of implicit conditional speech acts (tips and promises) embedded in short 
vignettes. These speech acts were then anaphorically referenced using either a matching 
or mismatching speech act noun (e.g., ‘this tip…’ or ‘this promise…’). 
 
Example item 
Chris was looking to a buy a new car. After spending all day in car dealerships he had 
decided to make an offer on a second hand Audi. The dealer had earlier said “if you buy 
the car, I’ll give you 12 months free insurance.” / The dealer had earlier said “if you buy 
the car, make sure you negotiate with the insurance company for the best deal.” This was 
a useful promise/tip that could save him money. After half an hour of haggling they 
agreed a deal on the car. 
 
Since promises and tips come from different speech act categories (inducements and 
advice respectively) a mismatching anaphoric reference violates the first step of the 
pragmatic cues algorithm because promises and tips have a different locus of control. It is 
well established that mismatching anaphoric references cause a processing penalty during 
comprehension compared to when the anaphor and antecedent match (e.g., Stewart, 
Pickering & Sanford, 2000). This processing penalty also occurs for much smaller 
semantic mismatches, such as when the anaphor is an atypical example of a semantic 
category (e.g., ‘goose’ is atypical of the semantic category ‘bird’; Garrod & Sanford, 
1977). Therefore, if a reading time penalty is observed on or following the revealed 
speech act noun when the anaphor and antecedent mismatch (relative to when they 
match), it will suggest that readers are sensitive to the broad distinction between 
inducements and advice.  
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2.1.1 Design 
Participants read conditionals embedded in short vignettes. Each conditional indirectly 
communicated either a promise or a tip. Following each conditional, a target sentence 
contained an anaphoric reference that named the implied speech act as either a ‘tip’ or a 
‘promise’. This reference either matched or mismatched the implied meaning of the 
preceding conditional, allowing us to compare reading times for identical regions of text 
across conditions. For example, we could compare reading times to the anaphor 
‘promise’ following either an implied promise (matching) or an implied tip 
(mismatching) or similarly measure reading times to the anaphor ‘tip’ following an 
implied tip (matching) or implied promise (mismatching) . This resulted in a 2 x 2 
(Implied Speech Act x Referenced Speech Act) repeated measures design. 
 
2.1.2 Participants 
Thirty two volunteers from the University of Manchester population. All participants 
were native English speakers and did not have a reading disability. They were each paid 
£5.  
 
2.1.3 Materials 
The conditional statements used in the Experiment were categorised in an offline 
categorisation task, in which 100 participants categorised 36 speech acts as either a tip, 
promise, threat or warning. There were two versions of each statement, with one designed 
to be a tip and one designed to be a promise (split into two lists using a Latin Squares 
design, each list contained 12 filler items and was rated by 50 participants). Thirty two 
pairs of statements were retained from the offline categorisation task. Of these 
statements, those designed as promises were categorised as such by 92% of participants 
and those designed as tips were categorised as such by 89% of participants.  
For the comprehension experiment each statement was embedded within a five-
sentence vignette (see above for example. Further representative examples can be found 
in Appendix A. The full set of items for both experiments can be obtained by contacting 
the first author). The first two sentences provided context. Sentence three contained the 
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speech act. Sentence four then revealed the speech act to be either a tip or a promise. 
Sentence five contained additional contextual information. These passages were used to 
create four lists using a repeated measures, Latin-square design. Each list also contained 
16 filler passages.  
 
2.1.4 Procedure  
Participants were informed that they would be presented with a number of passages on a 
word-by-word basis. To advance through the passages, they pressed the space bar. 
Dashes were used to represent the rest of each passage. Only one word was visible at a 
time. Comprehension questions appeared on 25% of the trials. Participants first 
completed two practice trials.  
 
2.2 Results 
Individual word reading times to the target sentence containing the anaphoric reference 
were examined to form three analysis regions (see Table 1). Region 1 was the single 
word corresponding to the Referenced Speech Act (e.g., ‘tip’ or ‘promise’) to capture any 
rapidly occurring sensitivity to the (in)consistency of this reference. Region 2 was the 
remainder of the target sentence, up to and including the penultimate word. Region 3 was 
the final word of the target sentence and was intended to capture any sentence wrap up 
effects (Just & Carpenter, 1980). Two-way repeated measures ANOVAs (Implied Speech 
Act x Revealed Speech Act) were conducted treating participants (F1) and items (F2) as 
random factors for each analysis region. These were followed up with planned 
comparisons using one-tailed t-tests that treated participants (t1) and items (t2) as random 
factors for each comparison. 
 
 
****TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE**** 
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2.2.1 Region 1 
 
There were no main effects of Implied Speech Act (both Fs < 1) or Referenced Speech 
Act (both Fs < 1). Crucially, the interaction between these variables was significant 
(F1(1, 31) = 4.31, MSE = 4,182, p = .046, ηp2 = .12; F2(1, 31) = 10.72, MSE = 1,681, p = 
.003, ηp2 = .26). This revealed a reading time penalty when the Referenced Speech Act 
mismatched the Implied Speech Act. Planned comparisons showed that this reading time 
penalty was symmetrical (i.e., approximately the same effect size for both referenced 
speech acts): a penalty of 20 msec. merged when the word ‘promise’ was inappropriately 
used to describe an implied tip (t1(31) = 1.86, p = .037, ηp2 = .10  t2(31) = 1.62, p = .058, 
ηp2 = .078), whereas the penalty was 28 msec. when the word ‘tip’ was inappropriately 
used to describe an implied promise (t1(31) = 1.57, p = .064, ηp2 = .07; t2(31) = 2.6, p = 
.007; ηp2 =  .18).      
 
2.2.2 Region 2 
There were no main effects of Implied Speech Act (both Fs < 1) or Referenced Speech 
Act (F1 (1, 31) = 2.74, MSE = 39,970, p = .11, ηp2 = .08; F2 (1, 31) = 1.56, MSE = 
69,763, p = .22, ηp2 = .05) and no interaction between these variables (F1 (1, 31) = 2.64, 
MSE = 31,417, p = .11, ηp2 = .08; F2 (1, 31) = 1.49, MSE = 55,668, p = .23, ηp2 = .05). 
Planned contrasts that sensitivity to the implied speech act carried over into this region 
following the inappropriate anaphoric use of the word ‘tip’ (penalty = 79 msec. t1(31) = 
1.94, p = .031, ηp2 = .11;  t2(31) =  1.37, p = .09, ηp2 = .06), but no such carryover effect 
appeared after inappropriate use of the word ‘promise’ (penalty = 22 msec. t1(31) = .37, 
p = .36, ηp2 = .004; t2(31) =  .41, p = .34, ηp2 = .005). 
 
2.2.3 Region 3 
There were no main effects of Implied Speech Act (F1 (1, 31) = 1.86, MSE = 17,917, p = 
.183, ηp2 = .06; F2 (1, 31) = 1.29, MSE = 28,856, p = .265, ηp2 = .04), or Referenced 
Speech Act (F1 (1, 31) = 2.71, MSE = 7,782, p = .11, ηp2 = .08; F2 (1, 31) = 1.32, MSE = 
15,983, p = .26, ηp2 = .04) and no interaction between these variables (both Fs < 1). 
Planned contrasts revealed no reading time penalty when the words ‘promise’ (t1(31) =  
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.91, p = .18, ηp2 = .03; t2(31) =  .989, p = .17, ηp2 =  .03) and ‘tip’ (t1(31) = 1.2, p = .12, 
ηp2 = .045; t2(31) = .88, p = .19, ηp2 =  .02) were inappropriately used as an anaphor. 
 
2.3 Discussion 
Analysis of reading times to the explicitly revealed speech (Region 1) act revealed a rapid 
interaction as a result of the Referenced Speech Act mismatching the Implied Speech 
Act. This effect was approximately symmetrical for both promises and tips (i.e., the word 
‘promise’ was read 20 msec. faster following an implied promise than following an 
implied tip and the word ‘tip’ was read 28 msec. faster following an implied tip than an 
implied promise).  Since tips and promises come from different speech act categories 
(advice and inducement respectively), the reading time slow down for mismatching 
anaphoric references provides initial evidence that readers are able to rapidly discriminate 
between these speech act categories during comprehension. In terms of the pragmatic 
cues algorithm, these data support the idea that readers are able to use the pragmatic cue 
of speaker control to rapidly discriminate between inducements and advice.  
 Interestingly there was also some evidence (significant by participants only) 
following this initial sensitivity that inappropriate usage of ‘tip’ as an anaphor continued 
to disrupt processing into Region 2, whereas the initial effect for promises quickly 
subsided. In other words participants found it less disruptive to interpret an implied tip as 
a promise than to interpret an implied promise as a tip.  This suggestion of an 
asymmetrical spill over effect provides some evidence that promises may have a wider 
pragmatic scope than tips, with the concept of ‘promise’ overlapping to some extent with 
the concept of ‘tip’ but not vice versa. Specifically, when ‘promise’ was used as an 
anaphor to describe an implied tip there was less disruption to subsequent processing than 
when a ‘tip’ anaphor described an implied promise. This would be consistent with 
evidence in the conditional reasoning literature that promises tend to be perceived as 
pragmatically ‘stronger’ than tips (see Evans, 2005).  
While our findings show that readers are rapidly sensitive to the distinction 
between inducements and advice, these categories mirror a common distinction in the 
reasoning literature between indicative and deontic reasoning. While conditional advice 
invites a form of indicative reasoning about possibilities, conditional inducements 
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inherently require a form of deontic reasoning about permissions and obligations. Several 
offline deduction studies have noted differences in the way that people reason with 
indicative and deontic conditionals, with participants tending to draw more inferences 
(both valid and invalid) from inducement conditionals (Newstead et al., 1997). Given that 
our materials differed in the mode of reasoning required for comprehension, this contrast 
may have been reflected in our findings. Therefore, when a mismatching anaphor was 
processed, the processing penalty may have been caused by a mismatch at the level of the 
specific speech act (tip vs. promise), the more abstract level of the speech act category 
(advice vs. inducement), the mode of reasoning that was required (indicative vs. deontic) 
or any combination of the above.  
In Experiment 2 we refined our investigation by examining whether readers 
represent specific speech acts during comprehension in the absence of any mismatch at 
the levels of speech act category and mode of reasoning. This was achieved by focusing 
on conditional promises and threats, which both come from the same speech act category 
(inducements) and communicate a deontic relationship between p and q.  
  
3.1 Experiment 2 
Experiment 1 revealed that readers are sensitive to the broad distinction between speech 
act categories. Experiment 2 is identical in design to Experiment 1 but focuses on 
readers’ sensitivity to specific speech acts within the same category, by examining the 
processing of promises and threats (both of which are inducements). To differentiate 
speech acts at this level of representation both stages of the pragmatic cues algorithm 
must operate. The operation of these two stages may therefore be more cognitively 
demanding than differentiating between promises and tips (which required the operation 
of only the first stage). This motivates two competing predictions concerning the onset of 
any sensitivity. If readers are able to discriminate between speech acts within a speech act 
category as easily as they do for speech acts between categories, then a rapid sensitivity 
to a mismatching anaphor would be expected (as was found in Experiment 1). However, 
if conditionals from the same speech act category are pragmatically closer than those 
from different speech act categories (thus harder to discriminate), then that should 
involve an extra stage of processing. Any processing cost may then occur at a delay; i.e., 
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downstream from the speech act noun itself. This would be consistent with discourse 
processing studies in which semantically close anomalies (i.e., information that is 
implausible rather than incongruent) cause a delayed processing penalty (e.g., Rayner, 
Warren, Juhasz, & Liversedge, 2004; Stewart, Pickering, & Sturt, 2004).  
 
3.1.1 Design & Procedure 
The design and procedure were identical to Experiment 1 except that the two levels of 
each experimental factor were promises and threats rather than promises and tips. 
 
3.1.2 Participants 
Twenty four different participants were recruited from the same population as in 
Experiment 1.  
  
3.1.3 Materials  
As with Experiment 1, a series of contextualised promises and threats were rated in an 
offline categorisation task (n=40). Thirty two pairs of items were retained for use in the 
comprehension task, with promises rated as such by 81% of participants and threats rated 
as such by 74% of participants. These conditionals were embedded vignettes (see 
example and Appendix B).  
 
Example item 
John was in a meeting with his project supervisor at university. They were discussing the 
results of the study for which John was employed as a Research Assistant. John’s 
supervisor said to him “if the results are written by next week, then I will put you on the 
paper as an author.” / John’s supervisor said to him “if the results are written later than 
next week, then I'll take you off the project.” John decided based upon this promise/threat 
that he would make sure the results were completed. He thought he would work on it 
over the weekend if necessary. 
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3.2 Results 
The three analysis regions were identical to Experiment 1. See Table 2 for means.  
 
 
****TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE**** 
 
 
3.2.1 Region 1 
There were no main effects of Implied Speech Act (F1 (1, 23) = 1.51, MSE = 1,943, p = 
.23, ηp2 = .62; F2 < 1) or Referenced Speech Act (both Fs < 1) and no interaction between 
these variables (both Fs < 1). Planned contrasts revealed no reading time penalties when 
the words ‘promise’ (t1(23) =  .34, p = .37, ηp2 =  .005);  t2(31) =  .27, p = .40, ηp2 = .002) 
and ‘threat’ (t1(23) = .97, p = .17, ηp2 = .04;  t2(31) =  1.0, p = .16, ηp2 =  .03) were 
inappropriately used as anaphors.  
 
3.2.2 Region 2 
There were no main effects of Implied Speech Act (both Fs < 1) or Referenced Speech 
Act (both Fs < 1) and no interaction between these variables (F1 < 1; F2 (1, 31) = 2.56, 
MSE = 112,417, p = .12, ηp2 = .08). Planned contrasts revealed no reading time penalties 
immediately after the words ‘promise’ (t1(23) =  .28, p = .39, ηp2 = .003;  t2(31) =  .7, p = 
.24, ηp2 =  .02) and ‘threat’ (t1(23) = .69, p = .25, ηp2 = .02;  t2(31) = 1.7, p = .05, ηp2 = 
.09) were inappropriately used as anaphors.  
 
3.2.3 Region 3 
Analysis of variance revealed a main effect of Implied Speech Act by items only (F1(1, 
23) = 2.7, MSE = 14,372, p = .11, ηp2 = .11; F2(1, 31) = 4.21, MSE = 18,886 p = .05, ηp2 
= .12) and a significant main effect of Referenced Speech Act (F1(1, 23) = 12.5, MSE = 
7,309, p = .002, ηp2 = .35; F2(1, 31) = 4.92, MSE = 24,775, p = .03, ηp2 = .14). The 
interaction between Implied Speech Act and Referenced Speech Act was also significant 
(F1(1, 23) = 8.40, MSE = 10,268, p = .01, ηp2 = .27; F2(1, 31) = 6.09, MSE = 18,886, p = 
.02, ηp2 = .16) revealing a reading time penalty when the Referenced Speech Act 
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mismatched the Implied Speech Act (relative to when the implied and revealed speech 
acts matched).  Planned comparisons revealed that this penalty was asymmetric, with a 
significant slowdown of 100 msec. at the end of a sentence that inappropriately described 
a promise as a threat (t1(23) = 2.49, p = .011, ηp2 = .21; t2(31) = 2.72, p = .006, ηp2 = .19), 
but a non-significant penalty of 20 msec. when a threat was described as a promise 
(t1(23) = .950, p = .18, ηp2 =  .04;   t2(31) = -.81, p = .21; ηp2 = .02).  
 
3.3 Discussion 
Analysis of the reading time data in Experiment 2 revealed that participants were not 
sensitive to the mismatch between conditional promises and threats until the end of the 
target sentence (Region 3). This delayed sensitivity suggests that during processing, 
speech acts from the same speech act category (inducements) take longer to discriminate 
following a mismatching anaphoric reference than speech acts from different categories 
(i.e., compared to the rapid penalty observed in Experiment 1). Since mode of reasoning 
and speech act category were held constant across conditions, our findings can only be 
attributable to the within category difference. This is consistent with the idea that speech 
acts within the same category are pragmatically closer (and thus harder to discriminate) 
than speech acts from different categories.  
 Interestingly, our results also revealed that when the delayed sensitivity to a 
mismatching anaphor eventually arose, the pattern of results was asymmetrical. 
Specifically, there was no statistically significant processing penalty when an implied 
threat (e.g., “if the results are written later than next week, then I'll take you off the 
project”) was anaphorically referenced as a promise (20 msec.). However, there was a 
large processing penalty (100 msec.) when an implied promise (e.g., “if the results are 
written by next week, then I will put you on the paper as an author”) was referenced as a 
threat.  
One explanation for this pattern of findings is that promises have a broader 
pragmatic scope than threats. Indeed, the common phrase “it’s not a threat, it’s a 
promise” emphasises how threats can be subsumed by promises. In this instance the 
speaker is using the perceived obligation associated with a promise (Searle & 
Vanderveken, 1985) to show that their threat is not hollow. Conversely, it would be 
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unusual to for someone to assert “it’s not a promise, it’s a threat”, as this makes the 
speech act pragmatically weaker by reducing the degree of obligation. Participants in 
Experiment 2 appear to have followed this distinction as they experienced a numerically 
large processing penalty when trying to interpret promises as threats.  
 
4.1 General Discussion 
Two experiments examined the interpretation of implied conditional speech acts during 
comprehension. In Experiment 1 a rapid reading time penalty was observed when an 
inducement (promise) or advice (tip) was anaphorically referenced as a speech act from a 
different category. In Experiment 2 a delayed penalty was observed when the 
mismatching anaphor was a speech act noun from the same category. In combination, 
these findings support a classification scheme that includes the broad speech act 
categories of inducement and advice. While speech acts from different categories are 
rapidly perceived as mismatching, speech acts from within the same category appear to 
be pragmatically closer and thus take longer to discriminate.  
 In terms of the pragmatic cues algorithm, our processing data are consistent with 
the idea that conditionals from different categories are more pragmatically distinct from 
those from the same category. However, they also revealed an important distinction 
within speech act categories. At present the second stage of the pragmatic cues algorithm 
distinguishes promise from threats based on the utility of the consequent for the listener. 
However, our data suggest that conditional promises are also perceived as having a 
broader pragmatic scope than threats. Participants experienced greater processing load 
when interpreting promises as threats than they did when interpreting threats as promises. 
Given that promises presuppose a greater degree of obligation than threats (Searle & 
Vanderveken, 1985) our findings suggest that threats may be perceived as pragmatically 
weaker than promises. Specifically, it appears that the act of promising can subsume the 
act of threatening to some extent, but threats cannot pragmatically subsume promises.     
Theories that rely on grouping statements under broad category labels must be able to 
account for such differences in interpretation within speech act categories.  
From a discourse processing perspective, our findings show that conditional 
speech acts are used to inform comprehension. However, it is important to acknowledge 
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that our findings do not necessarily imply the automatic activation of conditional speech 
acts as they are processed (c.f., Holtgraves, 2008). What they do show is that when a 
speech act noun anaphorically references an implied conditional speech act, readers are 
sensitive to the consistency of this anaphoric reference. At present, the precise processes 
leading to this sensitivity are unclear. For example, readers may not automatically 
activate the implied conditional speech act as it comprehended. Rather, they may defer 
interpretation and make a strategic backwards inference when the anaphoric reference is 
encountered. Determining whether the activation of conditional speech acts is automatic 
or strategic is an important question for future research.  
An issue that faces the study of conditionals more generally is how well the 
existing categories of conditional speech act actually capture the speaker’s intent.   While 
the speech acts described above were anaphorically referenced using the traditional labels 
of promises, tips, threats and warnings, further psycholinguistic research may help to 
identify further pragmatic cues that serve to delineate the existing categories. For 
instance, while the word ‘tip’ seems to have wide scope and could easily have be 
substituted for a number of synonyms in our study (e.g., suggestion, hint, advice etc.) the 
word ‘threat’ seems to have a much narrower scope and fewer synonyms. Future studies 
taking a time course perspective may help to more accurately define these speech act 
categories by revealing new pragmatic cues.  
 Expanding upon research that has demonstrated the importance of pragmatics on 
how conditionals are ultimately interpreted, our results show that pragmatic function 
guides semantic interpretation during discourse processing, providing the first step 
towards understanding how people understand everyday conditionals in real time.  This 
finding suggests that experimental paradigms that focus on incremental processing 
provide a useful avenue for the examination of factors that influence the interpretation of 
conditional statements. Such approaches allow for a broader cognitive perspective on 
conditionals. Arguably, this is needed for a full psychological account of conditionals to 
be developed. 
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Appendix A – Example items used in Experiment 1 
 
Items contain both versions of implied and referenced speech act.  
 
Chris was looking to a buy a new car. After spending all day in car dealerships he had 
decided to make an offer on a second hand Audi. The dealer had earlier said “if you buy 
the car, I’ll give you 12 months free insurance” / The dealer had earlier said “if you buy 
the car, make sure you negotiate with the insurance company for the best deal”. This was 
a useful promise that could save him money / This was a useful tip that could save him 
money. After half an hour of haggling they agreed a deal on the car.  
 
Peter was a university lecturer who had recently submitted a research paper to a scientific 
journal. After a couple of months he received a reply from the journal’s Editor. The reply 
stated “if you can make the paper shorter, then I will accept it for publication” / The reply 
stated “If you make the paper shorter, then it will be much easier to read”. A promise like 
this meant it was worth taking the time to change the paper / A tip like this meant it was 
worth taking the time to change the paper. Producing good quality research papers was an 
important part of his job.  
 
Eleanor was looking to book her summer holiday. She had visited the travel agent to try 
and find the best deal. The agent told her that “if your departure date is flexible, then 
we’ll guarantee you the cheapest deal”/ The agent told her that “if your departure date is 
flexible, then you’ll probably be able to find a cheaper deal”. This promise ensured that 
she could get a rock-bottom price / This tip ensured that she could get a rock-bottom 
price. She felt like she deserved a holiday after as she hadn’t been away in over a year.  
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Appendix B – Example items used in Experiment 2 
 
John was in a meeting with his project supervisor at university. They were discussing the 
results of the study for which John was employed as a research assistant. John’s 
supervisor said to him “if the results are written by next week, then I will put you on the 
paper as an author” / John's supervisor said to him "if the results are written later than 
next week, then I'll take you off the project". John decided based upon this promise that 
he would make sure the results were completed/John decided based upon this threat that 
he would make sure the results were completed. He thought he would work on it over the 
weekend if necessary.  
 
Adam and Nancy had been going out for over a year and Adam wanted Nancy to move in 
with him. However, Nancy hated Adam’s smoking and how her clothes smelt after being 
out with him. One night Nancy stated “If you give up smoking, then I will move in with 
you”. / One night Nancy stated “If you keep on smoking, then I will break up with you”. 
Nancy’s promise made Adam realise how much she hated his smoking/Nancy’s threat 
made Adam realise how much she hated his smoking. He decided that perhaps it was a 
dirty habit.  
 
Mary was halfway through her 12-month mobile phone contract and was unhappy with 
the service. She called her mobile phone provider and said she wanted to change 
networks. The customer service assistant told her "If you stay with our network, then 
we'll give you 100 free texts every month." / The customer service assistant told her "If 
you leave our network, then we'll take back your free phone."  This was the kind of 
promise that might influence her decision/This was the kind of threat that might influence 
her decision. Although the salesperson was asking for her to make a decision Mary 
decided to think about it for a few days.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 22 
Table 1: Mean reading times and standard errors (msec.) for each analysis region in 
Experiment 1. 
 
 
Implied 
Speech Act 
 
Referenced 
Speech Act 
   
Promise Tip 
Region 1 Promise  
 
301 (18) 323 (18) 
Tip 
 
321 (18) 295 (17) 
Region 2 Promise  
 
1,810 (87) 1,802 (88) 
Tip 
 
1,832 (102) 1,723 (87) 
Region 3 
Promise  
 
382 (43) 347 (26) 
Tip 
 
340 (28) 324 (24) 
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Table 2: Mean reading times and standard errors (msec.) for each analysis region in 
Experiment 2. 
 
 
Implied 
Speech Act 
 
Referenced 
Speech Act 
   
Promise Threat 
Region 1 Promise  
 
316 (18) 319 (21) 
Threat 
 
321 (20) 337 (21) 
Region 2 Promise  
 
2,037 (167) 2,149 (164) 
Threat 
 
2,093 (172) 2,016 (132) 
Region 3 
Promise  
 
329 (23) 450 (44) 
Threat 
 
349 (25) 350 (30) 
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Fig. 1: Pragmatic cues algorithm (López-Rousseau & Ketelaar, 2006) 
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